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Abstract 
This paper presents a model of social learning about the suitability of local conditions for 
new business ventures and explores its implications for the microeconomic patterns of 
economic development. I show that: i) firms tend to ‘rush’ into business ventures with which 
other firms have had surprising success thus causing development to be ‘lumpy’; ii) sufficient 
business confidence is crucial for fostering economic growth; iii) development may involve 
wave-like patterns of growth where successive business ventures are first pursued and then 
given up; iv) there is, nevertheless, no guarantee that firms pursue the best venture even in the 
long-run. 
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1 Introduction
Technology transfers are a prerequisite for many new business ventures in develop-
ing countries. This tends to make the prospects of such ventures hard to predict,
as it is often unclear how suitable local conditions are for the transferred technol-
ogy.1 The experiences of pioneering rms play an important role in reducing this
uncertainty. Their success with particular ventures is indicative of the suitability
of local conditions and the thus gained information can be used by other rms
to guide their investment decisions.2 So, learning about the suitability of local
conditions for new business ventures then also has a social dimension, as rms
not only learn from their own experience but also from the experiences of other
rms.
This paper develops a model of such social learning and explores its impli-
cations for the microeconomic patterns of growth. In this model, rms update
their prior beliefs about the suitability of local conditions for particular business
ventures in a Bayesian fashion by observing their own experience and the expe-
riences of other rms with these ventures. Four main results emerge from the
analysis. First, I show that rms tend to rushinto business ventures with which
other rms have had surprising success thus causing development to be lumpy.
One implication of this lumpiness is that improvements in the economic en-
vironment (policies, institutions, infrastructure, etc.) which trigger entry into
1Rosenberg (1982, p. 249), for example, writes that "the successful transfer of technology is
not a matter of transporting a piece of hardware from one geographic location to another (but)
depends greatly upon the specic domestic circumstances in the recipient country". Evenson and
Westphal (1995, pp. 22622263) emphasize that "the body of case study research and anecdotal
evidence includes numerous cases of failure to achieve the minimum mastery needed to attain the
levels of productivity expected when the physical investment was undertaken. It also includes
numerous cases of unforeseen success in achieving su¢ cient mastery to exceed the expected levels
of productivity".
2Evenson and Westphal (1995), for example, cite several cases of such a technology di¤usion
from pioneering rms to imitators.
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unexplored business ventures can potentially kick-start economic development.
Second, I demonstrate that su¢ cient business condence is crucial for fostering
economic growth and development. If rms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs,
viable business ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic beliefs
never make rms pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even if ini-
tial beliefs are su¢ ciently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned if rms
misinterpret the evidence available to them. Third, I establish that development
may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive business ventures are
rst pursued and then given up until a venture is found for which local conditions
are su¢ ciently suitable. Finally, I show that, despite this potential stuttering
towards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that rms pursue the best venture
even in the long-run.
Case study evidence suggests that this lumpinessand the associated stut-
teringtowards a viable business venture seem to be important characteristics of
the microeconomic pattern of growth and that the above mentioned social learn-
ing plays an important role in bringing about such lumpinessand stuttering.
Regarding lumpiness, Rhee (1990), for example, reports that Bangladeshs gar-
ment industry experienced a sudden and rapid takeo¤ in the late 1980s due to
the wide imitation of a surprisingly successful initial business venture of the Dae-
woo Corporation of Korea.3 In a related paper, Rhee and Belot (1990) point
out that the astonishing success of the Colombian cut ower industry originated
in a single surprisingly successful investment of an American entrepreneur which
was then imitated by local entrepreneurs. Burgess and Venables (2004) present
further evidence that development is often lumpyand conclude that lumpiness
is an important characteristic of the microeconomic pattern of growth. As for the
stutteringtowards a viable business venture, an interesting example is provided
by Urquiola et al. (1999) who report that the recent growth of the agricultural
3 Interestingly, Rhee (1990) points out that Daewoo did not have much condence in the
project reecting the uncertain success of technology transfers. It mainly viewed the venture as
a vehicle to get involved in some of Bangladeshs other industries.
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sector in lowland Bolivia was driven by successive booms of rice, cotton, sugar
cane, and nally soybeans.4 As is pointed out by Arrieta et al. (1990, pp. 221-
258), the unfavorable local conditions (in particular climate and soil) were among
the main reasons why the booms of rice, cotton, and sugar cane all came to an
end eventually.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the rst attempt to explore the
implications of social learning about the suitability of local conditions for new
business ventures on the microeconomic patterns of economic development. Ho¤
(1997) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) also study social learning about the
suitability of local conditions for new business ventures, but focus on the ine¢ -
ciency which comes along with the learning externality, rather than studying its
implications for the microeconomic patterns of growth. Entrepreneurship is shown
to be underprovided in these papers due to the divergence between the private
and the social value of gaining experience. Burgess and Venables (2004) sketch
a framework which suggests that increasing returns to scale which are external
to individual rms (e.g. thick market externalities) could be underlying lumpy
development. Social learning about the suitability of local conditions for new
business ventures does not play a role in their analysis. This social learning, how-
ever, seems crucial for understanding the above examples of lumpydevelopment
as well as the observed stutteringtowards a viable business venture.5
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section lays out
the basic model and discusses its implications for the microeconomic patterns of
growth. It is demonstrated how the model generates lumpydevelopment and how
4 In particular, it is reported that the share of rice, cotton, sugarcane, and soybeans in the
total area under cultivation exceeded 20 percent in successive time periods. The shares of rice,
cotton, and sugarcane declined quickly after their respective booms. Soybean cultivation, on the
contrary, remained successful and is now dominating the local agriculture.
5Caplin and Leahy (1993) also explore the welfare implications of such social learning in the
context of structural change and again demonstrate that entrepreneurship is underprovided. In
a related paper, Caplin and Leahy (1998) show that social learning can potentially explain the
rapid revitalization of New Yorks Lower Sixth Avenue. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005)
argue that a countrys pattern of specialization is in part determined through social learning and
provide some evidence that the pattern of specialization is a determinant of economic growth.
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improvements in the economic environment may kick-start microeconomic growth.
Also, the importance of su¢ cient business condence in fostering economic growth
and development is highlighted. A third section then generalizes this basic model
to allow for multiple sectors or regions. It is shown that development may take
a wave-like pattern where successive business ventures are rst pursued and then
given up until a venture is found for which local conditions are su¢ ciently suitable.
Moreover, it is shown that, despite this potential stuttering towards a viable
venture, there is no guarantee that rms pursue the best venture even in the
long-run. A fourth section concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 The setup
Consider an economy with two sectors - traditional and modern - which is inhab-
ited by L workers and is endowed with T units of land. The traditional sector
uses both land and labor while the modern sector requires labor only. Initially,
all workers are employed in the traditional sector so that the modern sector is
not operating. It is uncertain how suitable local conditions are for modern sector
production and modern sector rms rely on their exogenous initial beliefs when
deciding on whether or not to invest in the modern sector. If their priors are
optimistic enough so that there is entry into the modern sector, some information
about the unknown parameter is revealed. In particular, the outputs of the active
modern sector rms are indicative of the suitability of local conditions for modern
sector production, and this information is then used by rms to update their prior
beliefs in a Bayesian fashion. Importantly, all rms are assumed to observe these
outputs (not only the active modern sector rms). Moreover, their priors are
assumed to be identical so that the best guess about the unknown parameter is
always the same among all rms. Also, potential costs of entering or leaving the
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modern sector are ignored. Therefore, there is no intertemporal trade-o¤ to be
solved by the rms when making their entry decision. Free entry ensures that, in
all time periods, the number of modern sector rms is such that expected prots
are driven down to zero. The equilibrating mechanism is labor market competi-
tion. Workers have to be attracted from the traditional sector which increases the
wage rate. Output prices do not play a role here. The economy is supposed to be
small relative to other economies and trades both modern and traditional sector
goods at xed prices.6 For simplicity, a demand side is not explicitly modelled.
In a small open economy, production decisions are independent of consumption
decisions, and a particular demand structure only has to be imposed if one wants
to solve for domestic consumption or the pattern of international trade.
2.2 The modern sector
2.2.1 Technology
It is assumed that each modern sector rm has a xed labor requirement l. Modern
sector rm output is determined by multiplying this xed labor requirement with
the productivity parameter , a random variable which can take two values, 
(high productivity) and  (low productivity),  >  > 0. The suitability of local
conditions for modern sector production is captured by p, the probability that
productivity is high. This parameter is xed but unknown to the rms. Denoting
modern sector rm output by y, modern sector technology is thus given by
yit = itl (1)
where it =  with probability p, it =  with probability 1   p and i indexes
rms and t indexes time. In short, rms can either be successful or not and the
6Another option would be to use product market competition as the equilibrating mechanism.
This modication would be relatively straightforward and the results of the basic model would
remain unchanged.
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suitability of local conditions determines average rm success.7
All the risk is assumed to be borne by the modern sector rms in this model.
At the beginning of the period modern sector rms enter (exit) the modern sector
and hire (lay o¤) workers which determines the wage rate. Then the productivities
are drawn, determining whether a rm makes prots or losses.8
2.2.2 Learning
Firms have exogenously given prior beliefs about p which they update through a
process of Bayesian learning. It is assumed that all rms can observe the outputs
of all modern sector rms so that the history of modern sector rm output is
common knowledge. Since a modern sector rms output is either high or low
according to whether the productivity draw of the given rm in the given time
period was good or bad, the number of good productivity draws in all draws is
also common knowledge. Since all modern sector rms have access to the same
information and use the same updating method, beliefs are the same among rms
in all time periods.
Priors In particular, suppose that the rmsbeliefs about p are characterized
by a beta distribution, p s Be (; ), so that9
f(p) / p 1(1  p) 1 (2)
The beta distribution is a relatively general distribution on the support [0; 1].
Basically, all reasonably smooth unimodal distributions on this support can be
approximated by a beta distribution by choosing suitable values for the parameters
 and . This includes the case of uniform priors ( =  = 1) which is probably
7Notice that this specication of technology guarantees that y can only take positive values.
8Of course, one has to assume that modern sector rms own some assets which they can use
to nance the losses in the bad state. This will be done henceforth.
9Recall that the beta distribution has density f(p) = 1
B(;)
p 1(1  p) 1, where 0 5 p 5 1,
B(; ) = ( 1)( 1)
+ 1 .
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the most intuitive starting point in the case of complete ignorance.10 For future
reference, recall that if p s Be (; ), then E(p) = + .
Updating Consider now the updating of these beliefs. Denote the number of
good draws until period t   1 by zt 1 and the total number of draws by nt 1.
If mt is the number of modern sector rms operating in period t and st is the
number of high productivity draws in period t, then zt 1 = s1 + ::: + st 1 and
nt 1 = m1 + ::: +mt 1. As discussed above, these two variables can be inferred
from the output history and constitute the information set available to rms at
the beginning of period t. By BayesRule, the posterior beliefs are given by
f(p j zt 1; nt 1) = g(zt 1 j p; nt 1)f(p)
g(zt 1)
(3)
where g (:) is a density function which is further dened below. Notice that
therefore f(p j zt 1; nt 1) / g(zt 1 j p; nt 1)f(p). Since zt 1 is just the number of
successesin a series of nt 1 draws, zt 1 follows a binomial distribution of index
nt 1 and parameter p, zt 1 s B (nt 1; p) so that
g(zt 1 j p; nt 1) =

nt 1
zt 1

pzt 1(1  p)nt 1 zt 1 (4)
Hence, g(zt 1 j p; nt 1) / pzt 1(1   p)nt 1 zt 1 . Recalling that f(p) / p 1(1  
p) 1 it then follows that
f(p j zt 1; nt 1) / p+zt 1 1(1  p)+nt 1 zt 1 1 (5)
and hence
p j zt 1; nt 1 s Be (+ zt 1;  + nt 1   zt 1) (6)
10The proposition that uniform priors should be used in the case of complete ignorance is
sometimes referred to as Bayespostulate.
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These are the updated beliefs at the beginning of period t. Nicely, they are again
beta distributed so that the incoming information only changes the parameters
of the underlying distribution of beliefs but not the distribution itself.11 This
implies in particular that
E(p j zt 1; nt 1) = + zt 1
+  + nt 1
(7)
Discussion Modern sector rms are assumed to be risk-neutral so that the ex-
pected probability of a high modern sector rm productivity will be a key variable
in the analysis. Before proceeding with the remainder of the model, it is there-
fore useful to clarify some of the properties of the updating of this expectation.
For this purpose, the following decomposition is particularly insightful. It is easy
to show that the posterior expectation is just a weighted average of the prior
expectation and the success rate, the ratio of high productivity draws to total
draws,
E(p j zt 1; nt 1) = t 1E(p) + (1  t 1) zt 1
nt 1
(8)
where t 1 = +++nt 1 . Notice that  is decreasing in the total number of
draws which is very intuitive. The success rate zt 1nt 1 is a natural estimator
of p and it becomes more inuential relative to the prior belief, the more ex-
perience has been gained in the modern sector. Several things become obvi-
ous from this decomposition. First, it becomes clear that only surprises change
the rms beliefs since E(p j zt 1; nt 1) 7 E(p) () zt 1nt 1 7 E(p) ()
zt 1
nt 1 7 E(
zt 1
nt 1 ).
12 Second, it is revealed that beliefs converge to the truth as
11 In other words, the beta distribution is thus conjugate to a binomial likelihood which makes
it a suitable prior distribution for the purposes of this model. See Lee (1998) for more details on
this derivation.
12 It is also easy to show that E (p j zt 1; nt 1) = et 1E (p j zt 2; nt 2) + 1  et 1 st 1mt 1 ,
where et 1 = ++nt 2++nt 1 , which emphasizes this point. Relative to the previous rather than the
initial period, st 1
mt 1 7 E (p j zt 2; nt 2) is a surprise.
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the number of observations increases since limnt 1 !1 t 1 = 0 and
zt 1
nt 1 con-
verges to p as nt 1  ! 1. Third, it follows that the current beliefs can al-
ways be calculated by updating the initial beliefs using formula (8). The result
is the same as if the current beliefs are calculated recursively by applying the
updating rule period by period. To see this dene pt  E(p j zt 1; nt 1) and
consider the sequence p1; :::; pt; :::; pT . From the above formulae it follows that
pT =

++(m1+:::+mT 1)
p1 +
(m1+:::+mT 1)
++(m1+:::+mT 1)
(s1+:::+sT 1)
(m1+:::+mT 1)
if the initial belief
is used and pT = 
0
0+0+(mt+:::+mT 1)
pt +
(mt+:::+mT 1)
++(mt+:::+mT 1)
(st+:::+sT 1)
(mt+:::+mT 1)
if the
period t belief is used, where 0 =  + (s1 + ::: + st 1) and 0 =  + (m1 + ::: +
mt 1)   (s1 + ::: + st 1). Some manipulation reveals that both expressions are
indeed the same.13
2.3 Traditional sector
The traditional sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive with constant returns
to scale technology. Apart from labor, it also requires land for production (e.g.
the agricultural sector). In particular, technology is of the Cobb-Douglas type:
xt =
 
T Tt
  
LTt
1 
(9)
where x is traditional sector output, T T is the land employed in the traditional
sector, LT is the labor employed in the traditional sector, and 0 <  < 1. Equa-
tion (9) gives the aggregate traditional sector output. Firm subscripts have been
omitted as individual rm size is anyway indeterminate with constant returns to
scale technology. Choose units such that the price of the traditional sector good is
1 so that the value marginal product of labor in the traditional sector is given by
(1  )

Tt
LTt

. As usual, workers are paid their value marginal product so that
the (inverse) labor supply curve faced by modern sector rms trying to attract
13All these are general properties of Bayesian learning. See, for example, Chamley (2004) for
more on this issue.
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workers from the traditional sector is given by
wt = (1  )

T
L  LMt

(10)
In this equation, w is the wage rate and the factor market clearing conditions
L = LTt + L
M
t and T
T
t = T have been imposed. Recalling that modern sector
rms have a xed labor requirement l so that the number of modern sector rms
at time t is given by mt =
LMt
l , the wage rate is given by
wt = (1  )

T
L  lmt

(11)
The wage rate hence increases in all time periods in which rms are entering the
modern sector. This is, of course, due to fact that the Cobb-Douglas technology
exhibits diminishing returns to labor.
2.4 Equilibrium
If units are again chosen such that the price of the modern sector good is 1,14
modern sector rm prots in period t are given by
it = itl   wtl (12)
From above, recall the notation pt  E(p j zt 1; nt 1). At the beginning of period
t, period t prots are thus expected to be
E(it j zt 1; nt 1) =

pt+ (1  pt)  wt

l (13)
As discussed previously, free entry drives E(it j zt 1; nt 1) down to zero. Firms
are not willing to invest in period t unless they expect to make prots in period t.
14Recall that the economy is assumed to be small relative to other economies and trades both
modern and traditional sector goods at xed prices. Therefore, it is possible to choose units in
both sectors which set goods prices equal to 1.
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They never invest just to learn something about the suitability of local conditions
since the private value of this information is zero. If there is a good surprise and
local conditions turn out to be very favorable for modern sector production, this
becomes common knowledge and triggers entry in the following period. Using the
wage rate from equation (11), the equilibrium number of modern sector rms at
time t can thus be computed from setting (13) equal to zero,
mt =   
pt+ (1  pt)
 1

(14)
where the parameters   Ll and   Tl (1  )
1
 have been introduced to simplify
the notation.15 Since  > , the equilibrium number of rms is thus increasing in
pt. The better local conditions are believed to be, the more modern sector rms
are operating. Together with equation (7), this equation yields
mt =   h
+zt 1
++nt 1
 
  + i 1 (15)
=   h
+(s1+:::+st 1)
++(m1+:::+mt 1)
 
  + i 1
Hence, the number of rms in period t depends on the number of rms in previous
periods and the history of high productivity draws. The industrialization path
is random, since changes in beliefs are driven by the random productivity draws.
Notice also that, for a given history, the number of rms is increasing in  and
decreasing in . This is because an increase in  () makes beliefs more skewed
to the left (to the right) so that local conditions are believed to be more (less)
suitable for modern sector production.
To make the model interesting, assume that
15Of course, the equilibrium number of modern sector rms cannot be negative. So if  5

[pt+(1 pt)]
1

, mt = 0.
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 <



<  (16)
This assumption ensures that the modern sector rms entry decisions are not
independent of their beliefs. If
  


< , the initial wage rate would be so
low that it would be protable to enter the modern sector even if the bad state
occurred with certainty. Similarly, if  <
  

 , the initial wage rate would be
so high that it would not be protable to enter the modern sector even if the
good state occurred with certainty. With this condition, there hence exists an
expected success probability p such that the modern sector is operating if and
only if beliefs are more optimistic than p. From equation (14) it follows that this
threshold belief is given by16
p =
  

   
  (17)
It is easy to show that p is decreasing in both productivities given that the above
parameter restriction is satised. This is not surprising since higher productivities
make modern sector production more attractive regardless of the suitability of
local conditions.
This completes the derivation of the basic model. The next section now turns
to analyzing its implications for industrial growth and development.
2.5 Analysis
This analysis of the basic model establishes the rst two results of the paper. In
a rst part, it is shown that su¢ cient business condence is crucial for fostering
economic growth. The discussion in that part also serves to characterize more gen-
erally the development patterns which are consistent with the model. In a second
part, it is then demonstrated how social learning about the suitability of local
conditions for new business ventures can lead to lumpyeconomic development.
16Notice that  <
 



<  () 0 < p < 1.
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2.5.1 Business condence and the patterns of modern sector devel-
opment
In this model, business condence is captured by the rmsinitial beliefs about
the suitability of local conditions for modern sector production. Three main
points need to be made to characterize how these beliefs shape the microeconomic
patterns of growth:
1. If initial beliefs are su¢ ciently pessimistic, there will never be any modern
sector production regardless of how suitable local conditions are in reality.
If p1 < p, no rm nds it protable to invest in the modern sector in the
rst time period. But without modern sector activity, there is no learning
and hence no investment in future time periods. No rm has an incentive
to incur an expected loss in one period in order to learn something about
the suitability of local conditions for modern sector production, since this
information has no private value in the given context of social learning.
2. If local conditions are not suitable for modern sector production, p < p,
modern sector production will always be given up at some point in time.
If local conditions are suitable for modern sector production, p > p, and
modern sector production is not given up, the number of rms will converge
to the full information equilibrium
mFI =   
p+ (1  p) 1 (18)
This is due to the convergence property of Bayesian learning which was
discussed in section (2.2.2). If the modern sector does not stop operating,
nt 1  ! 1 as t  ! 1 so that pt  ! p. Beliefs converge to the truth as
experience is gained in the modern sector. If p < p and p1 > p so that there
is some modern sector activity initially although local conditions are not
suitable for modern sector production, beliefs will therefore hit p at some
14
point in time with probability 1. From then on, the modern sector will
stop operating and beliefs will remain unchanged since no new information
becomes available. Similarly, if p > p and p1 > p so that there is some
modern sector activity initially and local conditions are suitable for modern
sector production, beliefs will converge to the truth provided that modern
sector production is not given up. As pt  ! p, mt  ! mFI from equation
(14).
3. Even if there is some modern sector activity initially and local conditions
are suitable for modern sector production, p > p and p1 > p, modern sector
production will be given up with a positive probability. This is because p
is only the expected value of the success rate stmt which is distributed over
[0; 1]. Su¢ cient bad luck will lead to a series of bad surprises stmt < pt which
will drag down beliefs to the threshold level p. The more suitable local
conditions are for modern sector production (the higher p) and the more
optimistic initial beliefs are (the higher p1), the less likely it is that a viable
modern sector is given up. The higher p, the less likely it is to get a su¢ cient
number of success rates stmt < p which are necessary to make beliefs reach p
if p1 > p as is obvious from the updating formula. Also, the higher p1, the
more success rates stmt < p are required to make beliefs reach p if p1 > p as
the incoming information is always weighted with p1.
As an illustration, the case of a viable modern sector and too pessimistic
initial beliefs is drawn in gure 1. The two dotted lines illustrate that if the priors
are such that there will be some initial activity in the modern sector, beliefs
either converge to the truth or to the threshold level. This corresponds to the
number of rms converging to the full information equilibrium or to modern sector
production being given up. The dashed line illustrates that if priors are such that
there is no initial investment, then beliefs will stay unchanged since no experience
is gained.
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In summary, if rms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs, viable business
ventures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic beliefs never make rms
pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even if initial beliefs are suf-
ciently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned if rms misinterpret the
evidence available to them.
2.5.2 Lumpinessof modern sector development
In their analysis of lumpyeconomic development, Burgess and Venables (2004)
suggest to divide the determinants of microeconomic growth into 1st advantages
and 2nd advantages. In their framework, 1st advantagescapture the prerequi-
sites of growth such as good policies, institutions, and infrastructure, while 2nd
advantagescover the self-reinforcing aspects of growth which boost modern sec-
tor development once it has started. As indicated earlier, increasing returns to
scale which are external to the rm (e.g. thick market externalities) are thought
to be underlying these 2nd advantagesin their analysis.
Although thick markets do not play a role here, it is nevertheless insightful to
apply this conceptual framework to the present analysis. Here, 1st advantages
are captured by the two productivity parameters which get larger as the economic
environment improves. Once the environment is favorable enough to induce some
modern sector investment, the evolution of beliefs becomes important for the pat-
tern of development. Due to the learning dynamics, this development pattern
can - though need not - be self-reinforcing so that social learning can be seen as
a potential source of 2nd advantage. To see this, consider an initial situation
where beliefs are such that no rm has an incentive to invest in the modern sec-
tor. As 1st advantages improve,  and  increase so that p decreases. If the
productivities increase su¢ ciently, p will at some point become lower as p1 so that
some rms enter the modern sector. Now the process of learning begins. Since
beliefs only become more optimistic as a consequence of good surprises, the mod-
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ern sector will only continue to grow if the productivity draws are surprisingly
good, stmt > pt. This can happen either by chance or because local conditions are
truly surprisingly suitable for modern sector production, p > p1. If it happens
by chance and local conditions are in reality not very well suited for modern sec-
tor production, modern sector development will take an inverted u-shape since
eventually beliefs must converge to the truth. If, however, local conditions are in-
deed surprisingly favorable, learning can lead to longer lasting, rapid growth until
the full information equilibrium is attained. It is this adjustment of expectations
following overly pessimistic initial beliefs that can bring about lumpymodern
sector development in this model.
This is illustrated in gure 2. Suppose that at time t 1st advantagesare
such that some investment in the modern sector occurs. If local conditions are
in reality not suitable for modern sector production so that the full information
equilibrium number of rms is zero, then good surprises can only occur by chance
which can give rise to a u-shaped development pattern as depicted by the dashed
line. If, however, the full information equilibrium number of rms is positive,
good surprises do not come by accident and can give rise to rapid modern sector
development as shown by the dotted line. Then learning about the suitability
of local conditions has a 2nd advantage character since growth is then self-
reinforcing.
Notice that this discussion also implies that improvements in the economic
environment may map discontinuously into microeconomic growth. As long as
increases in the productivity parameters are not su¢ cient to trigger entry into
the modern sector, the improvement in the economic environment does not have
any e¤ects. But if the economic environment becomes su¢ ciently good so that
some rms invest in the modern sector, the modern sector may take-o¤ suddenly
so that small changes in the institutional environment may trigger rapid economic
development.
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3 Multiple modern sectors or multiple regions
Consider now a simple extension of the basic model allowing for multiple sectors.
This extension delivers the two main additional results. First, it is established
that development may involve a wave-like pattern of growth where successive
business ventures are rst pursued and then given up until a venture is found for
which local conditions are suitable. Second, it is shown that, despite this potential
stutteringtowards a viable venture, there is no guarantee that rms pursue the
best venture even in the long-run.
Suppose thus that there are r modern sectors indexed by j and k and assume
that local conditions suit di¤erent modern sectors di¤erently so that pj 6= pk,
j 6= k, for all j, k = 1; 2; :::; r. Only a few changes to the basic model are required
to allow for this generalization. Modern sector technologies are now given by
yjit = 
j
itl (19)
where jit =  with probability p
j , jit =  with probability 1   pj ; and  > .
Crucially, the parameter p now has an index j to denote that local conditions suit
di¤erent modern sectors di¤erently. At the beginning of period t, period t modern
sector rm prots in sector j are thus expected to be17
E(jit j zjt 1; njt 1) =
h
pjt+ (1  pjt )  wjt
i
l (20)
Therefore, the maximum wage a rm of modern sector j can pay in period t and
expect non-negative prots is given by
wjt = p
j
t+ (1  pjt ) (21)
The discussion of this extended model is again summarized in three remarks.
Remark 1 claries an important property of the extended model while remarks 2
17The output prices are again normalized to 1 for simplicity.
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and 3 establish the main additional results:
1. At any given point in time, only one modern sector will operate. From
equation (21) it is obvious that wjt is increasing in p
j
t . Since break even
wages must be paid in equilibrium due to the free entry assumption, rms
in the modern sector which is believed to perform best under the given local
conditions are thus paying the highest wages. Firms of any other modern
sector will not be able to a¤ord these high wages and will not be operating.
Notice that such extreme specialization even evolves if beliefs are uniform
initially since one good surprise from one modern sector su¢ ces to make
rms rushinto that sector.
2. Although only one modern sector will operate at any given point in time,
it must not always be the same one. As a given modern sector is active,
information about the suitability of local conditions for this particular mod-
ern sector is revealed which changes the rmsbeliefs about that sector. At
the same time, beliefs about all other sectors are una¤ected. A series of
bad surprises, s
k
t
mkt
< pkt can drag down p
k
t to the level of the modern sector
which was initially believed to be second best. Then this modern sector
starts operating and information about it becomes available. If there are
good surprises, it will continue to be active. If there are bad surprises, pro-
duction in the initial modern sector will be resumed. Notice that a given
sector k might always be operating if and only if pk > pjt for all j 6= k
since beliefs converge to the truth eventually. The true suitability of local
conditions for a given modern sector must hence be better than the expected
suitability of local conditions for all other modern sectors.
The potential stuttering towards a viable business venture follows as a
corollary from this result. To see this most clearly, consider the extreme
case where rms wrongly believe all sectors to be viable initially, pj1 > p
for all j, although local conditions are only suitable for modern sector k,
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pj < p for all j 6= k and pk > p. Then, of course, rms will eventually give
up all sectors they attempt until they reach sector k, indeed giving rise to
a wave-like pattern of economic development.18
3. Production will not necessarily move to the best modern sector as time
passes by and knowledge accumulates. From remark 1 we know that the
modern sector which is believed to be best will be operating, in general, not
the modern sector which is best in reality. From remark 2 we know that
a modern sector can only be active over a long period of time if the true
suitability of local conditions for that sector is better than the expected
suitability of local conditions for all other modern sectors. This implies
that the suitability of local conditions for the best sector must hence be
underestimated to allow for a less productive modern sector to be operating
in the long run.
Of course, the remarks from the basic model also apply with suitable mod-
ications: 1) If initial beliefs are su¢ ciently pessimistic, no modern sector will
develop; 2) If production is not viable in any of the modern sectors, it will be
given up with probability 1. If one modern sector keeps operating for a long time,
the equilibrium number of rms in that sector will converge to the respective full
information value; 3) Even if local conditions are suitable for some sectors and
one of these modern sectors is active, modern sector production will be given up
with a positive probability.
Notice that the same extension could also be interpreted as being the case
of multiple regions which o¤er di¤erent suitabilities for modern sector production
and share a common labor market. The predictions would, of course, be analogous:
1) Only one region is operating a modern sector at any given point in time; 2)
Nevertheless, di¤erent regions can operate a modern sector at di¤erent points in
18As was claried by remark 3 of the previous section, the rms may, of course, also give up
the viable sector k by mistake.
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time; 3) The modern sector will not necessarily move to the best region as time
passes by.
4 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of social learning about the suitability of local
conditions for new business ventures and explored its implications for the micro-
economic patterns of growth. The analysis delivered four main results. First,
rms tend to invest in business ventures with which other rms have had sur-
prising success, thus causing development to be lumpy. One consequence of this
lumpinessis that improvements in the economic environment (policies, institu-
tions, infrastructure, etc.) may map discontinuously into microeconomic growth.
Second, su¢ cient business condence is crucial for fostering economic growth and
development. If rms have overly pessimistic initial beliefs, viable business ven-
tures remain unattempted, whereas overly optimistic beliefs never make rms
pursue non-viable ventures permanently. However, even if initial beliefs are suf-
ciently optimistic, viable ventures may be abandoned if rms misinterpret the
evidence available to them. Third, development may involve a wave-like pattern
of growth where successive business ventures are rst pursued and then given up
until a venture is found for which local conditions are su¢ ciently suitable. Finally,
despite this potential stutteringtowards a viable venture, there is no guarantee
that rms pursue the best venture even in the long-run.
Although the role of technology transfers was stressed in the motivation of
this paper, the mechanisms which were highlighted here are probably at work in
many other settings. Firms can learn from the experiences of other rms whenever
there is non-idiosyncratic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty concerning factors which
a¤ect all rms alike. Such social learning can then lead to lumpyand stuttering
economic growth unless those uncertain business ventures are patentable.
Regarding future research, more formal econometric work on the importance
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of such learning externalities now seems to be most urgently needed. I believe that
this paper could be a useful starting point for such research since it delivers some
observable (and potentially testable) predictions for the microeconomic patterns
of growth.19 The main challenge, of course, is to disentangle social learning from
other determinants of the microeconomic patterns of growth.
19Hausman and Rodrik (2003, pp. 613-614), for example, argue that it is hard to test the
predictions of their model since much of our story has to do with outcomes that are not observed:
the failure to develop non-traditional activities because of inadequate incentives to invest in
learning what one is good at producing.
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Figure 1: Business condence and the microeconomic patterns of growth
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Figure 2: Sudden and rapid modern sector development
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